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THE  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS 
OF  THE  SHANTUNG 
QUESTION 


Published  by 

CHINESE  PATRIOTIC  COMMITTEE 
New  York  City 


August.  1919 


IMPORTANT  ANNOUNCEMENT 


Owing  to  the  absence  of  Mr.  K.  P.  Wang,  the 
Secretary  of  the  Committee,  please  address  all 
communications  temporarily  to 

MR.  Q.  K.  CHEN 

(^Treasurer  and  Acting  Secretary) 

P O.  Box  No.  3 Station  J. 

New  York  City 


THE  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS 
OF  THE  SHANTUNG 
QUESTION 


CHINESE 


Published  by 

PATRIOTIC  COMMITTEE 
New  York  City 


August.  1919 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2017  wjth  funding  from 
Columbia  University  Libraries 


https://archive.org/details/shantungquestionOOchin 


The  Economic  Aspects  of  the  Shantung 
Question 

Considerable  light  has  been  thrown  on  the  moral, 
legal  and  ’political  aspects  of  the  Shantung  question, 
but  its  equally  important  economic  phase  seems  to  have 
been  entirely  neglected.  Under  articles  156,  157  and 
158  of  the  Peace  Treaty,  generally  known  as  the  Shan- 
tung clauses,  Japan  has  acquired  a right,  so  to  speak,  to 
succeed  to  all  mining  and  railway  concessions  which 
Germany  exacted  from  China  before  the  war  and  to 
all  German  public  properties  in  the  territory  of  Kiao- 
Chau.  In  order  to  know  what  such  a right  includes  it 
is  necessary  to  advert  to  the  text  of  the  Shantung  pro- 
visions which  read  as  follows: 

ARTICLE  156. — Germany  renounces,  in  favor  of 
Japan,  all  her  rights,  titles  and  privileges— partic- 
ularly those  concerning  the  territory  of  Kiao-Chau, 
railways,  mines  and  submarine  cables,  which  she 
acquired  in  virture  of  the  treat}'  concluded  by  her 
with  China  on  March  6,  1898,  and  of  all  other 
arrangements  relative  to  the  Province  of  Shantung. 

All  German  rights  in  the  Tsing-tao-Tsinan-Fu 
Railway,  including  its  branch  lines,  together  with 
its  subsidiary  stock  of  all  kinds,  stations,  shops, 
fixed  and  rolling  stock,  mines,  plant  and  material 
for  the  exploitation  of  the  mines  are  and  remain 
acquired  by  Japan,  together  with  all  rights  and 
privileges  attaching  thereto. 

The  German  State  submarine  cables  from  Tsing- 
tao  to  Shanghai  and  from  Tsing-tao  to  Che  Foo, 
with  all  the  rights,  privileges  and  properties  at- 
taching thereto,  are  similarly  acquired  by  Japan, 
free  and  clear  of  all  charges  and  incumbrances. 


3 


ARTICLE  157. — The  movable  and  immovable 
property  owned  by  the  German  State  in  the  terri- 
tory of  Kiaochow,  as  well  as  the  rights  that  Ger- 
many might  claim  in  consequence  of  the  works  or 
improvements  made  or  of  the  expense  incurred  by 
her,  directly  or  indirectly,  in  connection  with  this 
territory,  are  and  remain  acquired  by  Japan,  free 
and  clear  of  all  charges  and  incumbrances. 

ARTICLE  158. — Germany  shall  hand  over  to 
Japan  within  three  months  from  the  coming  into 
force  of  the  present  treaty  the  archives,  registers, 
plans,  title  deedsi  and  documents  of  every  kind, 
wherever  they  may  be,  relating  to  the  administra- 
tion, whether  civil,  military,  financial,  judicial  or 
other,  of  the  territory  of  Kiao-Chau. 

Within  the  same  period  Germany  shadl  give  par- 
ticulars to  Japan  of  all  treaties,  arrangements  or 
agreements  relating  to  the  rights,  title  or  privileges 
referred  to  in  the  two  preceding  articles. 

These  articles  only  set  forth  in  general  terms  the 
concessions  and  properties  Japan  has  acquired,  say- 
ing nothing  about  their  economic  value  or  earning 
capacity.  This  ommission  consequently  leads  super- 
ficial observers  to  forget  that  the  railroad  and  mining 
concessions  now  transferred  to  Japan  are  of  vital 
economic  importance  to  China  and  the  outside  world. 
As  worked  out  by  the  Germans  these  concessions 
served  and  will  serve  as  very  effective  weapons  to 
capture  the  whole  trade  in  the  Shantung  province  and 
to  debar  outsiders  from  having  a due  share  in  its 
market. 

In  brief,  the  railway  concessions  in  Shantung 
amount  to  575  miles,  exclusive  of  the  Tsingtao-Tsinan 
Railroad  which  was  constructed  and  has  a mileage  of 
310  miles.  Within  a distance  of  30  lis  (about  10 
miles)  from  each  side  of  these  railways  the  Germans 


4 


had  the  right  to  develop  the  mines.  These  railway 
and  mining  concessions  are  dwelt  upon  at  length  else- 
where in  this  booklet  and  the  treaty  stipulations  rel- 
ative thereto  are  also  set  forth  in  somewhat  detail. 

General  Economic  Conditions 

Commercial  developments  and  possibilities  in 
Shantung  deserve  wide  attention.  In  the  year  of  1912 
Tsingtao,  the  only  important  commercial  port  in 
Shantung,  carried  two-fifths  of  the  entire  German 
colonial  trade,  and  the  articles  imported  through  this 
port  into  Shantung  amounted  to  $45,000,000.00  ex- 
clusive, however,  of  the  materials  imported  for  rail- 
way construction  and  mining  which  were  usually 
supplied  by  German  corporations.  In  1913  the  import 
trade  jumped  over  $50,000,000.00,  and  had  not  the 
outbreak  of  war  in  1914  interrupted  the  importation 
of  foreign  goods,  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the 
total  value  of  imports  would  soon  have  passed  the 
100  million  mark. 

It  is  interesting  to  know  that  the  articles  imported 
consist  principally  of  kerosene,  petroleum,  papers,  cot- 
ton goods,  cotton  yarns,  sugar,  dyestuflFs,  etc.  Accord- 
ing to  the  returns  of  the  Chinese  Maritime  Customs, 
there  has  been  a steadily  increasing  demand  for  kero- 
sene and  cotton  goods.  Before  the  war  Shantung 
relied  upon  Russian  and  American  kerosene  as  the 
two  principal  sources  of  supply,  but  the  war  and  the 
civil  strife  in  Russia  have  entirely  cut  off  the  Russian 
source,  leaving  the  market  to  American  oil.  With 
Russia  still  in  political  chaos,  this  favorable  situation 
will  continue  for  several  years.  Cotton  goods  and 
cotton  yarns  have  a big  and  ready  market  in  Shan- 
tung and  large  profit  has  been  reaped  in  this  field. 

Shantung  is  chiefly  an  agricultural  country,  pro- 
ducing in  large  quantities  such  products  as  wheat, 
barley,  beans,  maize,  millet  and  other  grains.  The 
principal  exports  are  peanuts,  straw  braid,  bean  cake, 
tussore  yams,  cattle-hides,  live  stock,  eggs,  fmit. 


5 


p>ongee  or  Shantung  silk  as  it  is  commonly  called.  Be- 
fore the  war  the  Germans  established  in  Kiao-Chau 
various  factories  equipped  with  modern  machinery  to 
put  these  agricultural  products  in  a better  shape  so 
as  to  command  a better  market  abroad  or  elsewhere. 
The  wider  the  market  for  the  native  products,  the 
higher  will  be  the  purchasing  power  of  the  population, 
and  this  would  in  turn  enable  the  people  to  absorb 
more  foreign  imports  such  as  sugar,  cotton  goods, 
luxuries,  etc.  The  commercial  records  for  the  past 
few  years  support  this  statement. 

In  connection  with  this  description  of  the  general 
economic  conditions  in  Shantung,  the  American  public 
must  bear  in  mind  that  no  matter  how  rich  Shantung 
is  or  will  be,  yet  under  the  Versailles  treaty,  foreign 
investors  or  exporters  could  not  expect  to  gain  a foot- 
hold in  the  Shantung  market  because  the  present 
Shantung  clauses  virtually  authorize  Japan  to  close 
the  open  door.  With  the  assistance  of  railways  the 
Germans  were  able  to  put  foreign  competitors  hors 
de  combat,  and  their  disciples,  the  Japanese,  are  even 
in  a better  strategical  position  to  do  so  by  virtue  of  the 
tacit  assent  of  the  other  Powers. 

Railway  Rights 

In  virtue  of  article  156  of  the  Peace  Treaty 
Japan  holds  the  right  to  construct  railways  in  Shan- 
tung—a right  that  has  an  economic  as  well  as  a polit- 
ical significance.  Politically,  such  a right  is  usually 
the  forerunner  of  peaceful  penetration  and  political 
domination;  economically,  it  helps  in  monopolizing 
trade  and  exploiting  the  people.  The  history  of  the 
railways  in  the  United  States  is  replete  with  instances 
of  how  a mighty  railroad  could  develop  an  industry 
in  one  section  of  the  country  and  cripple  it  in  another, 
how  it  had  wrested  business  from  its  competitors,  how 
it  compelled  consumers  to  pay  exorbitant  prices  for 
transportation  service.  This  is  no  less  true  of  the  rail- 
ways in  Shantung.  According  to  German  reports,  the 
German  merchants  diverted  in  1912  nearly  the  whole 

6 


trade  of  the  province  to  Tsingtao  by  utilizing  the  aid 
of  the  Tsingtao-Tsinan  Railway,  although  they  act- 
ually did  only  6o  per  cent,  of  the  total  business.  By 
the  same  means  the  Japanese  will  try  their  utmost 
to  bring  trade  wholly  within  their  hands. 

In  regard  to  the  railway  concessions  in  Shantung, 
Clause  I of  Section  II  of  the  treaty  of  1898  between 
China  and  Germany  provides ; 

China  agrees  to  permit  Germany  to  construct 
two  railway  lines  in  the  Province  of  Shantung; 
one  from  Kiao-Chau,  past  Weihsien  Ch’ing  Chau, 
Poshan  Hsien,  Tzu-Ch’uan  and  Tsou-p’ing  to 
Tsinan-Fu  zmd  the  Shantung  frontier;  the  other 
from  Kiao-Chau  to  Ichow  and  thence  past  Lcu-wu 
Hsien  to  Tsinan-Fu.  The  railway  from  Tsinan-Fu 
to  the  frontier  of  Shantung  is  not  to  be  begun  until 
the  line  to  Tsinan-Fu  has  been  built,  in  order  that 
arrangement  may  be  made  for  a junction  with  the 
main  lines  constructed  by  China.  The  route  of  the 
line  is  to  be  left  for  future  arrangement. 

Before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  Germany  wrested 
from  China  three  railway  concessions,  one  from 
Tsingtao  to  Tsinanfu,  another  from  Kaomi  to 
Suchow-Fu  via  Ichow  and  still  another  from  Tzinan- 
fu  to  Shuntehfu  on  the  Peking-Hankow  line.  The 
Tsingtao-Tsinan  Railway  was  constructed  and  com- 
pleted in  1904  by  the  German  Schantung  Eisenbahn 
Gesellschaft  with  a capital  of  $14,000,000.  The  ori- 
ginal cost  of  construction  was  $13,000,000  but  in  1912 
it  ran  up  to  $14,500,000,  It  has  a mileage  of  256 
miles  on  the  main  line  and  54  miles  on  the  branch 
lines.  The  most  important  branch  line,  28  miles  in 
length,  runs  from  Changtien  to  Poshan  Hsien  where 
considerable  coal  deposits  are  being  worked. 

The  Tsingtao-Tsinan-Fu  Railway  has  been  in 
operation  for  the  past  ten  years.  It  has  done  a very 
prosperous  business  since  it  was  opened  to  traffic.  Ac- 
cording to  the  figures  of  1913,  the  traffic  over  the  line 
amounted  to  900,000  freight  tons,  the  passengers  car- 
ried numbered  over  a million  and  a quarter,  and  the 


7 


receipts  for  the  year  1912  reached  the  mark  of  $2,400,- 
000  as  over  against  $1,200,000  for  expenditures.  And 
the  dividend  declared  was  7.5  per  cent.  Be  it  remem- 
bered that  with  the  aid  of  this  mighty  railway  the 
Germans  were  able  in  1912  to  draw  almost  all  the 
traffic  in  Shantung  to  the  harbor  of  Tsingtao. 

The  railway  project  running  from  Kaomi  (near 
Kiao-Chau)  to  Suchow-Fu  was  not  carried  out,  and 
under  a protocol  signed  in  1909,  Germany  relinquished 
to  China  the  right  to  construct  this  line  but  on  con- 
dition that  China  should  employ  German  capital  and 
German  engineers,  and  on  further  condition  that 
China  should  undertake  to  begin  construction  not  later 
than  1915  after  which  it  is  questionable  whether  the 
right  of  construction  would  revert  to  Germany.  This 
railway  project  has  a mileage  of  334  miles,  and,  if 
constructed,  will  form  the  base  of  a triangle  of  which 
the  lines  from  Suchow-Fu  to  Tsinanfu  and  from  Kiao- 
Chau  to  Tsinan  constitute  the  other  two  sides.  Like 
the  Tsingtao-Tsinan  Railway  this  line  would  draw  off 
traffic  from  Lunghai  to  Shantung  ports  as  is  shown  on 
the  map.  It  is  rather  unfortunate  that  China  should 
have  failed  to  hasten  to  the  construction  of  such  an 
important  project. 

The  Kaomi~SuchoW“Fu  line  appeared  so  impor- 
tant to  the  Germans  that  they  felt  uneasy  and  irritated 
when  the  Tsin-Pu  Railway  built  with  British  capital 
made  connection  with  the  Tsingtao-Tsinan  line  at 
Tsinanfu  and  passed  down  to  the  south.  Writing  in 
Deutsches  Kolonial  Monatshlatt  for  the  year  of  1913 
a German  authority  expressed  the  opinion  that  the 
Tsin-Pu  Railway  would  eventually  cripple  all  German 
commercial,  financial  and  political  interests  in  Shan- 
tung and  urged  that  Germany  should  by  all  means  con- 
struct the  Kaomi-Suchow-Fu  line  in  order  to  safe- 
guard her  interests.  It  is  thus  clear  that  railways  in 
Shantung  have  a strategical  value  and  may  be  used  as 
a bulwark  against  aggression,  to  say  the  least. 

Another  line  contracted  for  but  not  constructed 
runs  from  Tsinanfu  to  Shunteh-Fu  on  the  Peking- 


10 


Hankow  Railway.  This  project  has,  at  least,  a mile- 
age of  241  miles.  Should  it  be  realized  by  the  Japa- 
nese, this  would  bring  Honan  and  adjacent  provinces 
imder  Japan’s  economic  and  political  control.  With 
this  vast  colony  in  the  center  and  a stronghold  in  Man- 
churia in  the  north,  Japan’s  grip  on  China  will  be  im- 
measurably strengthened  and  will  spread  in  all  direc- 
tions tmtil  she  controls  the  whole  of  northern  China 
both  economically  and  politically. 

The  railway  concessions  that  Japan  has  acquired 
under  the  peace  treaty  thus  amount  to  885  miles, 
and  to  realize  these  projects  a capital  of  $40,000,- 
000.00  would  be  required.  Under  the  present  cir- 
cumstances, China  can  neither  supply  capital  nor 
materials  for  construction.  She  has  only  unskilled 
labor.  The  capital  therefore  must  come  from  Japan 
or  other  Powers.  Even  granted  that  non- Japanese 
capital  is  invited,  there  is  no  assurance  that  Japan  will 
not  discriminate  against  it  in  one  way  or  another  as 
she  has  repeatedly  done  in  the  building  and  operation 
of  the  Manchurian  railways.  The  consequent  result 
will  be  that  non -Japanese  capitalists  will  hesitate  to 
invest,  and  the  whole  enterprise  will  be  financed  by 
Japan  alone— a danger  that  threatens  to  drive  out 
foreign  trade  from  the  provinces  where  Japan  alone 
has  a free  hand  in  the  administration  of  railways.  The 
situation  in  Manchuria  has  fully  demonstrated  all 
this.  History  will  repeat  itself  again  in  Shantung  and 
its  adjoining  provinces. 

Mining  Concessions 

Shantung  is  full  of  such  mineral  resources  as  coal, 
iron,  gold  and  other  metals,  but  as  recent  investiga- 
tions show,  coal  is  the  most  abundant  of  all.  As  in- 
dicated on  the  map,  rich  coal  deposits  and  coal  fields 
are  found  here  and  there,  along  the  Tsingtao- 
Tsinan-Fu  Railway,  and  two  of  these  coal  fields 
are  being  worked  very  profitably. 

Mining  concessions  in  Shantung  were  granted  to 
Germany  under  Clause  4 of  Section  II  of  the  treaty  of 
1898  which  reads  as  follows: 


II 


Within  30  lis  (about  10  miles)  of  the  above  rail- 
ways (as  specified  in  Clause  i.  Section  II) — as, 
for  instance,  in  Weihsien  and  Pashan,  on  the  north- 
ern line  from  Kiao-Chau  to  Tsinan-Fu,  and  in  Ichow 
Fu  and  Laiwin  Hsien,  on  the  Southern  line,  from 
Kiao-Chau  via  Ichow  to  Tsinan-Fu — Germany  is 
permitted  to  excavate  coal  etc. — The  necessary 
work  may  be  undertaken  by  German  & Chinese 
Merchants  combining  their  capital. 

In  accordance  with  this  Convention  German  cor- 
porations began  mining  operations  in  the  places  speci- 
fied, notably  at  Weihsien  and  Poshan  Hsien.  Of  these 
two  the  Poshan  deposit  is  perhaps  the  largest,  for 
its  output  in  1913  was  put  at  414,000  tons  while  the 
Weihsien  district  yielded  during  the  same  year  only 
199,000  tons. 

So  far  as  statistics  and  investigations  show,  the 
Poshan  coal  field  has  a wonderful  future  for  devel- 
opment; the  quality  and  quantity  of  its  products  out- 
rival all  the  rest.  According  to  an  authentic  state- 
ment in  the  Far  Eastern  Review  it  was  discovered  in 
1904  that  just  268  metres  (878  feet)  beneath  the  sur- 
face there  were  three  strata  groups  with  varying  quali- 
ties. The  first  group  100  metres  (328  feet)  below  the 
characteristic  top  layer  shows  about  16  metres  (52.5 
feet)  4 single  strata  of  2j4  metres  (8.2  feet)  alto- 
gether of  a really  first  class  rich  coal,  having  about 
17  per  cent,  gas  and  about  8 per  cent.  ash.  The 
second  group,  situated  about  60  metres  (196.8  feet) 
from  the  first,  contains  three  strata  in  17  metres  (55.8 
feet),  having  altogether  1.8  metres  (5.9  feet)  coal, 
likewise  of  the  best  quality,  but  containing  on  the 
average  15  per  cent,  gas  and  10  per  cent.  ash.  At  a 
further  distance  of  100  metres  (328  feet)  a third 
group  of  4 strata  is  found  in  an  extensive  mountain 
layer  of  about  20  metres,  (65.6  feet)  containing  4.2 
metres  13.8  feet)  of  an  anthracite  coal,  having  12  per 
cent,  gas  and  12  per  cent,  ash,  but  of  considerable 
heating  value. 


12 


The  Poshan  coal  is  largely  used  in  the  manu- 
facture of  coke  in  Shantung  and  elsewhere.  Its  heat- 
ing value  varies  from  lo  per  cent,  to  17  per  cent.  It 
is  therefore  very  suitable  for  oven  heating.  Another 
excellent  quality  of  the  Poshan  coal  is  its  smokeless- 
nesSj  and,  for  this  reason,  it  bids  fair  to  substitute  for 
the  expensive  Cardiff  coal  used  on  warships. 

By  the  end  of  1913  the  total  works  in  the  coaling 
operation  consisted  of  the  following: 

2 principal  shafts  for  rich  and  poor  coal, 

I emergency  shaft, 

I coal  washer  for  poor  coal, 

I coal  washer  for  rich  coal, 

I coal  separator  with  carriage, 

I large  repair  shop, 

I electric  shop. 

The  annual  quantity  produced  by  these  works  is 
as  follows: 


1910- 1911  544.3s  tons 

1911- 1912  „„283,2o8.5o  tons 

1913  ._.„„___4i4, 000.00  tons 


The  Weihsien  coal  field  was  operated,  beginning 
from  1902,  by  the  German  Schantung  Bergbau  Gesell- 
schaft  with  a capital  of  12,000,000  marks.  Its  output 
is  in  the  main  bituminous,  containing  about  15  per 
cent,  ash  and  30  per  cent.  gas.  The  Weihsien  coal  has 
a high  heating  power — almost  7,000  calories— -and  it 
also  has  the  advantage  of  having  a lighter  smoke. 

The  principal  seam  of  coal  is  about  9 feet  thick, 
at  a depth  of  450  ft.,  running  from  N.  E.  to  S.  W. 
The  top  seam  is  of  6.6  feet  thick.  Beneath  the  prin- 
cipal seam  is  a third  stratum  of  about  9.8  feet  depth. 

The  producing  capacity  of  the  Weihsien  coal 
field  is : 


igio-1911 

igii-1912 

1913 


13 


.193,497.05  tons 
.205,185.00  tons 
199,000.00  tons 


Besides  the  Poshan  and  Weihsien  mines  there  are 
other  rich  coal  fields  scattering  around  the  Tsingtao- 
Tsinan  Railway.  These  are  Hunghsan  with  an  annual 
output  of  414,000  tons,  Fangtze  with  199,000  tons, 
Yihsien  with  198,000  tons,  Tawenkow  with  72,000  tons 
and  Ichow  with  30,000  tons,  the  figures  being  taken 
from  the  statistics  of  1914.  The  Poshan,  Weihsien, 
Fangtze,  Hungshan  and  other  minor  mines  are  being 
exploited  by  the  Japanese  as  a result  of  the  Germans 
being  expelled  from  Shantung.  It  will  be  seen  from 
the  map  that  most  of  these  rich  coal  mines  lie  near  the 
Tsingtao-Tsinan  Railway,  and  this  special  location 
will  facilitate  transporting  their  output  to  all  parts  of 
the  world. 

Iron  ores  are  found  in  abundance  in  Shantung, 
notably  in  Chinlingchen  and  Ichow.  The  Chinlingchen 
mine  is  only  seven  miles  from  the  Tsingtao-Tsinan 
Railway.  It  is  now  worked  in  conjunction  with  the 
Hungshan  Colliery.  The  ore  contains  about  66.4  per 
cent,  of  iron,  28  per  cent,  residue,  .02  per  cent,  sul- 
phur and  traces  of  phosphur.  It  also  contains  cal- 
careous substance  which  makes  it  self-fluxing  and  faci- 
litates the  smelting  process. 

Gold  mines  have  long  been  discovered  at  two 
places,  namely,  Fengkia  in  the  Shantimg  peninsula  and 
Szemeitze  in  Kiao-chau,  but  as  yet  no  statistics  are 
available  concerning  their  operation  and  producing 
capacity. 

Conclusion 

Writing  in  Geographische  Zeitschrift  for  1914, 
Herr  Schmitthenner  stated  that  Japan’s  covetous  de- 
sire to  attack  Tsingtao  in  1914  was  undoubtedly  attri- 
butable to  the  rich  coal  and  iron  deposits  in  Shantung 
and  the  tremendous  earning  capacity  of  the  Tsingtao- 
Tsinan  Railway.  In  this  view  we  entirely  concur, 
but  Japan’s  ultimate  objective  seems  to  be  a conjunc- 
tion between  Manchuria  and  Shantung  and  the  conse- 
quent domination  of  all  northern  China.  This  goal, 
otherwise  unattainable,  the  Japanese  will  surely  reach 


14 


with  the  aid  of  the  peace  treaty.  And  it  is  a matter  of 
course  that  Japanese  economic  domination  will  be  fol- 
lowed by  commercial  exclusion  similar  to  that  hitherto 
witnessed  in  Manchuria  and  elsewhere. 

The  brief  sketch  in  the  preceding  pages  has 
clearly  shown  that  under  the  peace  treaty  Japan  gains 
a title  to  railway  and  mining  concessions  worth  hund- 
reds of  millions  of  dollars.  All  these  concessions,  to 
be  sure,  are  Chinese  property.  They  will  yield  to 
Japan,  an  annual  income  of  at  least  50  million  dollars. 
Besides,  the  railway  concessions  will  contribute  mater- 
ially towards  Japan’s  control  of  northern  China.  This 
is  one  of  the  good  reasons  why  China  refused  to 
sign,  the  principal  reason  being  the  legal  argument 
which  has  won  so  much  sympathy  and  support  out- 
side the  conference  at  Paris.  Indignation  against  such 
control  has  been  clearly  indicated  in  the  numerous 
recent  anti-Japanese  demonstrations  throughout  all 
the  length  and  breadth  of  China,  particularly  in 
Shantung.  China  can  not  without  protest  submit 
to  being  robbed  of  her  valuable  properties,  nor 
should  the  self-professing  champions  of  right  and 
justice  consent  to  such  robbery.  Had  China  signed 
the  peace  treaty,  that  act  would  have  amounted  to 
signing  a death  warrant  for  her  economic  and  polit- 
ical life.  Fortunately,  she  did  not. 

In  the  last  analysis,  the  Shantung  question  is  a 
business  proposition — a proposition  that  confronts 
China  as  well  as  the  outside  world.  It  has  beeni  point- 
ed out  that  a huge  capital  of  $40,000,000.00  will  be 
required  to  build  the  new  railways  in  Shantung,  and 
no  doubt  a considerably  greater  amount  will  be  nec- 
essary to  open  the  undeveloped  coal,  iron  and  gold 
mines  in  the  province.  It  has  also  been  pointed  out 
that  foreign  imports  such  as  cotton  goods,  petroleum, 
sugar,  etc.  find  a ready  and  wide  market  in  Shuntung, 
and  that  such  imports  had  already  jumped  over  $50,- 
000,000.00  in  1913.  These  are,  in  brief,  the  golden 
opportunities  for  foreign  investment  and  foreign 
trade.  Now  under  the  terms  of  the  peace  treaty  Japan 

15 


holds  the  power  to  close  the  door,  a power  she  will 
surely  exercise  in  the  course  of  time.  Consequently, 
all  the  profits  to  be  derived  from  the  railway,  mining, 
and  commercial  enterprizes  in  Shantung  will  go  to 
Japanese  coffers  as  a compensation  for  what  certain 
American  senators  call  “war  labors.”  And  eventually 
American  trade  already  established  in  the  northern 
provinces  will  be  driven  out. 

The  Japanese  menace  does  not  stop  here.  It  may 
go  further  than  the  average  person  can  imagine. 
There  is  reason  to  fear  that  the  continuous  influx  of 
wealth  from  China  to  Japan  will  enrich  the  latter  to 
such  an  extent  that  in  the  course  of  ten  or  twenty 
years  Japanese  junkers  will  be  able  to  dream  of  world 
conquest.  Once  let  loose  to  organize  and  draw  upon 
the  resources  of  China  these  jingoes  may  run  at  large 
and  prey  upon  everything  that  can  (add  to  tiheir 
territory  or  wealth.  Then  it  may  take,  as  it  did 
in  the  European  catastrophe,  the  united  effort  of  all 
peace-loving  nations  to  make  the  world  a safe  place 
to  live  in.  It  may  again  cost  millions  of  lives 
and  billions  of  treasure.  How  expensive,  and  inef- 
fective such  a policy  would  be.  Under  no  circum- 
stance should  we  allow  the  new  danger  to  knock  at 
our  door.  There  is  a better  and  more  righteous  way 
to  frustrate  Japanese  imperialistic  schemes,  namely, 
to  defeat  the  Shantung  settlement  as  it  now  'stands. 
It  is  a way  that  costs  neither  lives  nor  treasure ; it 
needs  only  firm  and  enlightened  public  opinion  to 
make  defeat  sure  and  lasting. 


i6 


LIST  OF  PUBLICATIONS 


1.  China  vs.  Japan,  February,  1919. 

2.  China’s  Claims  at  the  Peace  Table,  March,  1919 

3.  The  Kiao-Chau  Settlement.  May,  1919. 

4.  Might  or  Right?  May,  1919. 

5.  Why  China  Refused  to  Sign  the  Peace  Treaty. 

July,  1919. 

6.  The  Economic  Aspects  of  the  Shantung  Question. 

These  publications  will  be  mailed  upon  application  to 
Mr.  Q.  K.  Chen  whose  address  is  given  on  the  second  page  of 
the  cover. 


